

Homegrown Terrorism

The Threat Within

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Introduction

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2002—orchestrated from Afghanistan and carried out by foreign nationals—startled and frightened people the world over. Events since have produced a disquieting fear of quite another stripe—that of the homegrown terrorist. More than 200 died, and some 1,500 were wounded as a result of terrorist attacks in Spain on March 11, 2004, just days before the nation's general elections. In the Netherlands, the November 2, 2004, murder of the cinematographer Theo Van Gogh by an Islamic fundamentalist prompted a wholesale re-look at Dutch laws and policies regarding terrorism. England was rocked, July 7, 2005, by attacks on the London transportation system that killed 37 and injured some 200 others. The attackers in each of these cases were not emissaries of al Qaeda; they were citizens and residents who were sending a message to their own governments—which begs the question, Why? We would all like a crisp, clear answer to that question, because once we know why we can address the root cause within our own populations. However, it is far from clear that a single root cause can be found. A Dutch analysis of the population of the Netherlands suggests that an attraction to violence, rather than fundamentalism, might be at the root. The English bombings were carried out by British citizens of Pakistani descent who appear to have been highly susceptible to radicalization. The Spanish bombings were carried out by resident ethnic Moroccans who wanted to punish the Spanish government for its support of America's "War on Terrorism."

This paper attempts to illustrate how difficult, if not impossible, it is to find root causes of domestic terrorism that are of general applicability. There may be similarities from one nation to another, but focusing on such similarities may well lead the analyst astray. The fact that each terrorist sought to cause fear in their fellow countrymen may well be the only common denominator. It is likely to be more important to focus on the unique cultural stamp of the individual nation to assess the reason for violence-prone disquietude among its citizens and residents.

Unfortunately, many countries are now beginning to see similar threads of resentment that have begun to be expressed with violence at home. Here we briefly examine the experience of six countries with homegrown terrorism. Certainly, there are others that should be included in this survey; however, due to constraints of length we chose only six. In this paper, we eschew focus groups, such as animal and environmental rights groups, which are rightly described as terrorists when they use violence. We also leave aside the terrorist who acts to bring pressure on another nation—for example, the anti-Castro Cuban or the Sikh separatist who bombs a facility to express outrage at the conduct of another nation. Rather, we focus on the citizen and/or resident who seeks to cause harm to fellow citizens and residents, whether targeted for a single purpose, as with Theo Van Gogh, or murdered indiscriminately as in Spain and the United Kingdom.

Who are the Homegrown Terrorists?

The homegrown terrorism of focus in this paper is driven by some form of radical Islam and involves citizens and/or residents of Western countries who “have picked up the sword of the idea” and are willing to attack their own countries, even if they are themselves killed in the process.¹ The term homegrown requires some discussion since it tends to connote a sentiment that terrorists most often are alien to the targeted population. Indeed, ascribing qualities such as race or country of origin to terrorists increasingly frustrates any attempt to get to the heart of the problem itself. The fact that it is unnecessary to look beyond the borders of our own states for foreign sources of terrorism is perhaps one of the more shocking aspects of the new sources of terrorism for Western publics and policy makers alike. Potential terrorists may have a good understanding of Islam or they may have cherry-picked parts of the *Koran* and cobbled them together with rhetoric from speeches by bin Laden and other popular al Qaeda figures.

The term homegrown also must be more precisely defined because terrorists might be more closely classified if they are placed along a “terrorist spectrum.”² This may range from lone wolf individuals who wish to perpetrate an attack, to groups who are a “self-recruited, self-trained, and self-executing” “group of guys” with few, if any, connections to an international conspiracy, to those who may be groups living in a particular country who have trained with and maintained connections to the al Qaeda transnational network, and finally to “ sleeper cells” planted by al Qaeda in a particular country who are bent on conducting a medium- or long-term terrorist mission.³ For the purposes of this paper, we mean homegrown to be associated with insiders. That is residents or citizens of countries who are either lone wolves, self-organizing “groups of guys,” or groups that have among their members some who have traveled and trained with al Qaeda and returned to their country of residence to commit terrorist attacks. The latter category may maintain close contacts with other transnational radical Islamic terrorist cells as well.

Homegrown terrorists fall into three categories: immigrants and visitors: legal or illegal; second- and third-generation members of the Muslim diaspora community; and converts to Islam. These groups are not mutually exclusive, as, for example, immigrants who may undergo religious conversion after arriving in the country in which they eventually plot acts of terrorism. The Dutch “apply the label ‘home-grown’(sic) when the radicalization process has taken place in the Netherlands, regardless of where the terrorist acts are

¹ Term used by a senior FBI official cited in Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American,” *The New Yorker*, January 22, 2007.

² We are indebted to Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, for this important insight.

³ “Protecting America from Terrorist Attack,” Speech by FBI Director Robert Mueller at City Club of Cleveland, Friday, June 23, 2006. The term “group of guys” or “bunch of guys” is thought to have been coined by Canadian officials who observed that a small group of Algerian men, of which Ahmed Ressam was a member, began as a group of essentially petty thugs but evolved into terrorists largely through self-radicalization. It is now used by many counterterrorism officials to denote small groups of amateur and self-organizing terrorist cells who have little to no contact with global terrorist networks and who therefore receive little to no guidance on executing terrorist operations.

committed.”⁴ Another view is to apply the term *homegrown* when and where the terrorist conspiracy was planned, regardless of where the terrorist attack took place. A more restrictive view is to apply the term when the act of terrorism was planned and committed in one country.

In this paper we define *radicalization* to mean the process whereby an individual or group adopts extreme Islamic views and justifies acts of violence, criminality, and terrorism based on those views. Because of globalization, radicalization and terrorism have both domestic and international characteristics that make them difficult, if not impossible, to separate. More than any other factor of globalization, the Internet has arguably been responsible for promulgating radicalism across the globe. “[T]he Internet allows groups to create and identify dedicated insiders—and to maintain fervor in those already dedicated to the cause—on a global scale.”⁵ It also provides an opportunity for people, such as 21-year old Samir Khan, a naturalized citizen born in Saudi Arabia, who generates a militant Islamic blog from his parents’ home in South Carolina.⁶ In this capacity he acts as a “kind of Western relay station for the multimedia productions of violent Islamic groups.”⁷ In so doing, functioning not unlike a street-level heroin pusher, he distributes translated radical messages and videos of acts of terrorism to incite gullible and impressionable Western youth.

In the first category, we generally consider immigrants to Western nations to be seeking a better life for themselves and their children. Most immigrants are hard-working people who spend their lives attempting to adapt and live in harmony with their new countrymen. Many young people from Muslim countries also attend universities in Western countries. Most successfully enter these countries on student visas and gain useful degrees that allow them to pursue careers in their own countries or in the West. However, three of the 9/11 suicide pilots, Mohammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah, were students in Hamburg. While it has been speculated that they may have been sent to Germany as “sleepers,” it is more likely that they became radicalized during their time in Hamburg. The three attended the al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg, which was known to German authorities as an important meeting place for people who wished to demonstrate their dislike for the West.

The second category is children or grandchildren of immigrants, that is, second- or third-generation members of the Muslim diaspora community. Many have grown up watching their parents and grandparents strive for a new life for their families in their adopted countries. This group tends to feel in some manner alienated by their societies. Whether or not they are citizens of the country in which they reside, they probably have been

⁴ “Homegrown Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Netherlands: Experiences, Explanations and Approaches,” Testimony by Lidewijde Ongerling, Dutch Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, June 27, 2007.

⁵ Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson, “Terrorist Use of the Internet: The Real Story,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 45, 2nd Quarter 2007 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press), 101.

⁶ This blog has been ranked among the top one percent of one hundred million Internet sites in the world. Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, “An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers,” *The International Herald Tribune*, October 14, 2007.

⁷ Ibid.

educated and seemingly assimilated in the culture of that country. Nevertheless, many are stuck between cultures; they are at once dominated by the traditional beliefs and values of their heritage, while being subjected to the pressures of the liberal and permissive home societies. The result is a rather unsettling view of self that does not fit in either culture. This leads to feelings of alienation and the development of what might be best described as a countercultural movement that expresses a puritanical devotion to Islam combined with derision and hatred for non-Muslims. They feel that they must be the protectors of an Islam that is being assaulted in such countries as Afghanistan and Iraq as well as inside countries of the West.

The third category comprises people who convert to radical Islam. Those who convert to a radical form of Islam may do so for a variety of reasons, to include marriage, peer pressure, and “finding religion” while serving prison terms. For example, Jose Padilla is thought to have converted during a stint in prison. Perhaps rather than finding true religion, he may have found comradeship in the violent prison gang culture constructed around some perverted form of Islam. While we know of few converts to radical Islam, their very mention seems to conjure a house of horrors among Western observers. This is possibly so because converts have no discernable racial or cultural characteristics to distinguish them. Perhaps the most famous converts to radical Islam have been Belgian Muriel Degauque, who committed a suicide attack in Iraq, and Richard Reid, the so-called “Shoe Bomber.” It was reported, for example, that while Degauque adopted Muslim clothing as a result of her conversion, in the run-up to her attack her handler encouraged her to take on a more Western appearance. Hence, terrorists’ actions cannot be ascribed to a foreign ethnicity to satisfy the public’s desire for simplistic answers. In terms of committing suicide attacks, converts are a terrorist recruiter’s dream and maintain their cover by dressing, eating, and acting like everyone else in society.⁸ Indeed, the al Qaeda terrorist handbook directs that they blend in with the people and their surroundings, where possible. While both Degauque and Reid may have been psychologically fragile, with personalities susceptible to manipulation, it is noteworthy that they became so absorbed in radical Islam prior to being recruited that they changed their appearances, habits, and manner of dress and, ultimately, sacrificed their lives. Indeed, while some are called to terrorism’s violence, others are slowly drawn to radicalism through a mix of religious zeal and peer pressure and are perhaps manipulated into using violence as a tool to fulfill still others’ aims.

There is a question as to whether the Muslims in Europe differ in their sentiments and attraction to terrorism from Muslims in North America, and whether there are differing constitutional, legal and even societal traditions that facilitate or hamper their ability to express themselves. European populations are as ethnically diverse as are North America’s. However, in Europe there are an estimated 15–20 million Muslims in the diaspora community, with Islam being the fastest growing of the continent’s religions.⁹ Further, it is estimated that approximately one million Muslims immigrate to European

⁸ Daniel Pipes, “Converts to Terror,” *The New York Times*, December 6, 2005.

⁹ Kristin Archick, John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel, *Islamist Extremism in Europe* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 29, 2005), 1.

Union (EU) countries each year.¹⁰ Open to debate is whether these burgeoning communities unwittingly serve as a support structure to a small minority of radicalized Muslims who are presented with a community into which they may blend more easily.

While differences in terms of constitutional and legal traditions are few amongst the EU countries, there are gradations of social tolerance that make for a rather marked contrast when, for example, the United States and the Netherlands or the United Kingdom are compared. In countries such as Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands, multi-ethnic societies have evolved such that young Muslims often have distinct identities that diverge from those of the states in which they currently reside—a divergence that, in the case of Canada, is even guaranteed by the Constitution. In fact, in many countries, there are distinct cultural enclaves where people apparently choose not to integrate into their adopted countries; rather, they live their lives within ethnic enclaves that have the linguistic, cultural, and social norms of their states of origin.

In France, authorities have long pursued assimilation as a model of social integration in the belief that minimizing cultural and religious differences will yield a secular, multiethnic French identity. In reality, most minorities in France feel alienated and excluded from greater French society. Indeed, “[t]hey’re also faced with homogeneity and an impenetrability of European society...which are not particularly open to immigrants.”¹¹ Meanwhile, in the United States, patriotism overwhelms most feelings of ethnic loyalty. Displaying a divergent identity in the United States is less accepted simply because that is not the norm; while tolerated, it is neither embraced nor guaranteed. Further, pluralism in the United States means that while religious and cultural diversity is respected, equality under the law is guaranteed. Arguably, it is this guarantee, which extends across the civic culture to include opportunities for education, housing, and economic prosperity, which has led to less social alienation of legal immigrants in the United States as compared to Europe.

Moreover, in Europe rifts have developed in society as a result of, on the one hand, states attempting to accommodate and assimilate all manner of cultures, and, on the other hand, sub-cultures attempting to assert their increasingly devolved powers. Both the attempts to accommodate parallel societies in states with multicultural policies and those that desire Muslim assimilation may have reached a societal breaking point. In terms of overall integration of Muslims into society, the record is poor in all European countries. A disproportionate number of Muslims in EU countries are unemployed, economically disadvantaged, lacking opportunities for advancement, or incarcerated. “[M]any feel a sense of alienation and discrimination from their host country.”¹² In fact, the integration policies of many European states have exacerbated already contentious situations because they tend to erect cultural barriers and force cultural adaptation. These policies have

¹⁰ Esther Pan, “Europe: Integrating Islam,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 13, 2005, available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html?breadcrumb=%2Fregion%2Fpublication_list%3Fgroupby%3D0%26id%3D0%26filter%3D323%26page%3D3>.

¹¹ Testimony of Robin Niblett before the European Affairs Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2006.

¹² Paul Gallis, Kristen Archick, Francis Miko and Steven Soehrel, “Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 18, 2005), 4.

produced virtual segregation, making it more difficult for Muslims and non-Muslims alike to live in harmony and understanding of each other. “In short, a crisis of self-identity resulting from some sort of disenfranchisement can leave the person open to new and possibly extremist ideas.”¹³ A further backlash has been that Islam is becoming a “protest identity.”¹⁴

¹³ Alejandro J. Beutel, “Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities: Lessons Learned for America,” Minaret of Freedom Institute, August 30, 2007, 4.

¹⁴ Oliver Roy cited in Esther Pan, “Europe: Integrating Islam,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 13, 2005, available at < <http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html>>.

Why Terrorism?

As for the impetus behind their actions, as stated earlier, much of the answer to “Why Terrorism” rather than simple political activism seems to be an attraction to the violence and perhaps the mystery or cachet that terrorism apparently offers. Yet these people should not be confused with roving bands of violent soccer thugs. While overall, al Qaeda no longer exists in its original form, it continues to inspire a growing revolutionary movement. Since January 2005, as many as 40 grassroots groups have formed (and continue to evolve) such that al Qaeda seldom exercises command and control. Each group serves as a component of a largely uncoordinated revolutionary movement that finds inspiration in world events and perceived or real social injustices, and benefits from (or is manipulated by) clever recruiting schemes.¹⁵

This follows from the “bleed-to-bankruptcy” plan bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri have articulated in recent years. It became an integral part of their long-term strategy following the 9/11 attacks and the fall of the Taliban. At that time, they realized that they could just as easily incite fellow Muslims to take up the cause with little or no direct involvement on their part. As the vanguard of the mujahideen they formulated a leaderless resistance that looks a great deal like the Aryan Nations model.¹⁶ This is a strategy in which small groups (cells) and individuals fight an entrenched power through independent acts of violence. The cells do not require any central coordination or communication with each other. Often they do not even have a leader.

The train bombings in Madrid and London, for example, demonstrated that those responsible did not have strong ties to al Qaeda's leadership. Rather, there were ties at some level between the bombers and clerics that did have a relationship to bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, or camps in Afghanistan. These same clerics, notably Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, provide ideological weight to the basic ideas set forth by al Qaeda leaders and offer guidance to aspiring mujahideen.

The rise of al Qaeda in Europe, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda in Iraq indicate that the movement is not necessarily directed from the top down, but that these organizations center around local leaders who pledge their allegiance to bin Laden as emir, or commander, and subsequently are acknowledged by the al Qaeda leadership. This is again consistent with the al Qaeda policy of being an inspirational force rather than a formal organization. This is not to say that al Qaeda central is dead. For example, when Abu Musab Zarqawi was enjoying substantial terrorist success in Iraq, al Qaeda (presumably Osama bin Laden) sent him an ethnic Iraqi “deputy” to demonstrate support.

¹⁵ Michael Scheuer, “Al Qaeda and Algeria’s GSPC: Part of a Much Bigger Picture,” *Terrorism Focus*, 4, no. 8, April 3, 2007.

¹⁶ Aryan Nations is a small, white-supremacist, neo-Nazi organization that is nominally Christian. Splinter groups and self-declared members have committed numerous violent acts.

Nevertheless, when al Zarqawi was killed, an unknown became the leader of the terrorism movement in Iraq, not the al Qaeda-sent deputy.¹⁷

The revolutionary movement has moved into the diaspora communities, and especially into the intelligentsia of those communities. Approximately 80 percent of the people who become radical Islamic militants join in the diaspora community via friends in soccer clubs, social groups, and local mosques. Recruitment is self-starting; groups of about eight persons are formed who become very close knit and who associate like a family, eating together, and even marrying each others' sisters.

Most are between the ages of 15 and 30 and have no particular racial or criminal profile to distinguish them—although once in the group they tend to wear the same clothes, display the same facial hair, and eat the same food. Many are married and have post-secondary education, with computer science, science, and medical degrees topping the list. Few have any formal religious education; they only encounter religion when they become “born again” in their militant group. They gain much of their information from websites, and often add to those websites, which can mutate faster than the groups that are constantly being formed. In this way the radical Islamic spirit is maintained and spread quickly and efficiently.¹⁸ Much of what they do is happenstance and dependent on who can obtain what, meet whom, and be at a particular place at a given moment.

¹⁷ Eben Kaplan, “Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, Zarqawi’s Mysterious Successor,” Council on Foreign Relations , available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10894/abu_hamza_almuhajir_zarqawis_mysterious_successor.html>.

¹⁸ For more detail, see Lachow and Richardson.

The United Kingdom

Many analysts believe that London has long been a breeding ground for Muslim extremism, even going so far as to give it the pejorative name “Londonistan” to describe the extent to which radical elements have influenced that city. Mosques in London’s Brixton and Finsbury Park areas are said to have indoctrinated both Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called “20th 9/11 hijacker” and Richard Reid.¹⁹ In the July 7, 2005, London attacks that killed 52 people and wounded 700, three of the four suicide bombers were British citizens of Pakistani descent and recently had traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Two weeks later, six more attackers attempted but failed to set off explosives in London’s metro and bus lines. Five of the six were Ethiopian-born, and the sixth, likely from somewhere in West Africa, had entered the UK on a Ghanaian passport in 2003. All were either naturalized citizens or had grown up in the UK.

London has been home for several decades to numerous clerics and Middle Eastern dissidents fleeing persecution. Because of strong UK free speech and privacy protections, several dissidents were able to espouse violence in the name of Islam, as long as they did not advocate violence against their adopted state. Indeed, the UK policy of “watchful tolerance” allowed the former preacher of London’s Finsbury Park mosque, Egyptian-born Abu Hamza Al Masri, and Syrian-born Omar Bakri Mohammed—who once led the fundamentalist Al Muhajiroun youth movement—to preach dissidence openly.²⁰ The London bombings made many Britons rethink their commitment to liberal free speech and protection of political activism. With the passing of the Terrorism Bill in 2006, it became illegal to glorify acts of terrorism. It is now an offense to encourage terrorism either directly or indirectly or to train or be trained as a terrorist.

From 2001 to March 2007, 1,166 people were arrested in the UK, of whom 221 were charged with terrorist crimes.²¹ Yet, of all the plots to date, the terrorist attack on July 7, 2005 has been the only one to reach fruition. The attack, which killed 52 people, was carried out by only four suicide bombers, Mohammad Sidique Khan (30 years old), Hasib Hussain (18 years old), Shezad Tanweer (22 years old), and Jermaine Lindsay (19 years old). The group was in contact with others in Pakistan between April and July 2005, suggesting that there were others involved in the plot. Three of the four (Khan, Hussain, and Tanweer) were second-generation citizens of Pakistani origin; Lindsay was born in Jamaica and converted to Islam in 2000. Khan and Tanweer visited Pakistan in November 2004, where Khan had allegedly attended a terrorist training camp in July 2003. It remains unknown who they met in Pakistan.

What is interesting about the perpetrators of the July 7 attacks is that not only were they unremarkable people, they were virtual amateurs. Both their methods and their materials

¹⁹ Archick, Rollins, and Woehrel, 2005, 4.

²⁰ Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta Jr., “For a Decade, London Thrived as a Busy Crossroads of Terror,” *The New York Times*, July 10, 2005.

²¹ “Most Freed After Terror Arrests,” *BBC News*, March 5, 2007.

required no special expertise. It is likely that someone with bomb-making experience assisted them at some point, because, as a Home Office Report points out, careful handling was required for these bombs. Hasib Hussein had to buy a new, 9-volt battery before boarding his bus, likely because he could not get his device to work.²² It is also likely that for this reason he may have missed the train he meant to bomb and had to board a bus in Tavistock Square, blowing it up almost a full hour after the other three simultaneous bombings on trains. The bombers did not represent a radical Islamic group within the British Muslim community. In fact, in his martyrdom video, the alleged ringleader of these bombings did not mention Iraq as a possible reason for their actions. If there was any significance to the date July 7, it remains unknown.

Britain has a rather complex relationship with its Islamic community. Indeed, while Britain has implemented a series of legal measures that may serve as deterrents for future would-be terrorists seeking to use the UK as a safe-haven, these measures do not necessarily help manage relations with the some 10–15 thousand Islamic militants who live dispersed among a population of 1.6 million Muslims.²³ Nor can there be a “war on terror” for Britain, as it would essentially mean waging war on members of its own population.

Approximately 70 percent of the Muslim population of Britain comes from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Most of these are from the impoverished and largely rural parts of Bangladesh and Pakistan and maintain ties to home, including sending regular remittances to family members and making regular visits. “There were 400,000 visits by UK residents to Pakistan in 2004—and the average length was 41 days.”²⁴ For the most part these citizens live in communities established in the 1960s as separate from British society. While this was done at first to preserve the cultural identities of sub-groups within society, it has now become a serious issue of isolationism that feeds misunderstanding and distrust between Muslims and non-Muslims.

In this regard, the results of a 2006 Pew Center Research Poll startled many with what it revealed about the sentiments of Muslims toward their fellow Britons. Sixty-seven percent of Muslims polled saw Westerners as selfish, 64 percent saw them as arrogant, and 63 percent thought them greedy. A surprising 24 percent of British Muslims thought that suicide bombing was justifiable at times.²⁵ The fact that the UK has engaged in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has generated still more deep-seated resentment and discontent amongst British Muslims. The fact that a majority of second- and third-generation Muslims live parallel lives in parallel communities in Britain does little to heal their alienation. “More and more people are moving from passive sympathy

²² *The Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on the 7th July 2005* (London: Home Office of the United Kingdom, May 11, 2006), 5, 6, 12.

²³ This number represents approximately 2.8 percent of the total population of 58.8 million people. “Rage and Britain’s Young Muslims,” *Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst*, September 1, 2006.

²⁴ Gordon Corera, “Were Bombers Linked to al Qaeda?” *BBC News*, June 7, 2006.

²⁵ This figure compares with 35 percent of Muslims in France, 21 percent in Spain, and 13 percent in Germany who thought suicide bombings were justifiable. Richard Wike, “Europe’s Muslims More Moderate: The Great Divide How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other,” *13 Nation Pew Attitudes Survey*, Pew Research Center, June 22, 2006, 4.

towards active terrorism through being radicalized or indoctrinated by friends, families, in organized training events here and overseas, by images on television, or through chat-rooms and websites on the Internet.”²⁶

While outlawing the glorification of terrorism and banning Imams from preaching hate has criminalized these acts, the United Kingdom is far from addressing the problem. That the problem is escalating is being borne out by the number of terrorist plots that have been uncovered, as well as the number of people being monitored by British authorities. In November 2006, then-Director General of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, announced that there were some 200 networks with approximately 1,600 individuals actively engaged in plotting or facilitating terrorist acts in Britain or against Britain from locations overseas. Further, she indicated that as of November 2006, MI5 was aware of 30 plots to kill people or damage the British economy.²⁷ By November 2007, the new Director General of MI5, Jonathan Evans, announced that this number had increased by 400 from the year before, such that there were at least 2,000 people in Britain who posed a “direct threat to national security and public safety” due to their support of terrorism.²⁸ He further reported that MI5 had uncovered numerous links between terrorist plots in the UK and a diverse and increasing range of countries.

July 7 seems to have stirred the extremist soup in the UK rather than dampen enthusiasm for terrorism. “While the bombings may have convinced Muslim communities in the UK of the problem in their midst, they also provided aspiring young militants with role-model martyrs and showed them that such attacks were possible with patience and planning.”²⁹ Further, along with the preachers who have openly espoused terrorist methods in the UK, several terrorists, while planning and raising money for a number of plots, have also recruited new members there. The terrorists involved in attacks in Casablanca, Madrid, Saudi Arabia, and Israel were among this number, as were the 9/11 hijackers. Further, two weeks to the day after the July 7th bombings, another conspiracy came to light, for which 43 people were detained under the Terrorism Act of the UK. A total of 17 suspects were charged in a plot to bomb London’s transportation network. One of the five main suspects, Hussain Osman, evaded authorities and fled to Italy but was arrested by Italian authorities one week later and extradited to face charges in the UK.

Other plots have been perpetrated by loners, such as Kazi Nurur Rahman, who was arrested in a police sting operation in November 2005 attempting to buy three Uzi submachine guns. This was to be only the first of a number of purchases that included a SAM-7 missile and rocket-propelled grenades for the purposes of shooting down airliners. Dhiren Barot (aka Abu Musa al Hindi), a naturalized British citizen originally from India, was a Hindu who converted to radical Islam. He has been described as the most ambitious al Qaeda-inspired radical in Britain, as his plans included bombing various sites in London, the World Bank in Washington, DC, and the New York Stock

²⁶ “Extracts from MI5 Chief’s Speech,” *BBC News*, November 10, 2006.

²⁷ Mary Jordan, “Britain’s MI5 Warns of Rising Terror Threat,” *The Washington Post*, November 11, 2006.

²⁸ “Thousands’ Pose UK Terror Threat,” *BBC News*, November 6, 2007; Sarah Lyall, “British Intelligence Chief Sharpens Terrorism Warning,” *New York Times*, November 6, 2007.

²⁹ “Britain’s Growing Jihadist Movement,” *Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor*, January 17, 2007.

Exchanges, as well as other landmarks in the United States.³⁰ He was arrested in London in 2004 along with seven others and pled guilty to conspiring to commit mass murder.³¹ A further plot was the so-called “fertilizer bomb plot” in which extremists were jailed for life in April 2007 for attempting to murder hundreds of people using 1,300 pounds of fertilizer in bombs at a number of public locations around London. Some of the would-be terrorists in this case met with the July 7 suicide bombers. All five were British citizens who Judge Sir Michael Astill said had “betrayed their country.”³²

Over time, Britain has found itself at odds with other countries with regard to counterterrorism strategy. In particular, numerous delays or refusals in processing extradition requests by other countries have angered and puzzled allies attempting to battle their own, complicated terrorism problems. Much of this is due to Britain’s strict civil liberties laws and constitutional tradition. For example, the extradition of Mohammed al-Gerbouzi, allegedly linked to the Madrid and Casablanca attacks, has floundered in British courts. In December 2004, the Moroccan government sentenced him in absentia to 20 years for the Casablanca attacks, but the UK has consistently refused to extradite him, claiming there is no evidence against him and there is no extradition treaty with Morocco.³³ Moreover, Spain and Jordan went through an arduous process with regard to the extradition of Abu Qatada, also known as Omar Mahmoud Mohammed Othman, a Palestinian with Jordanian nationality who received political refugee status in the UK in 1994.

The July 7 bombings were a wake up call to Britons that the policy of multiculturalism, which arguably is linked to feelings of isolationism and alienation on the part of Muslims in British society, was not working. Many believed such policies had helped to protect the country against attacks by radical Islamic groups. In a report on the London attacks, the Intelligence and Security Committee of the British House of Commons noted:

[U]nderstanding the potential threat from British citizens, including those born and brought up in the UK, appears to have developed over the period 2001–2005. The attempt by Richard Reid, the British “shoe bomber,” to blow up a transatlantic flight in 2001 clearly illustrated the possibility of British nationals becoming involved in terrorist activity.³⁴

³⁰ Michael Clarke, cited in Mary Jordan, “Al-Qaeda Figure gets Life for Plots Targeting U.S., Britain,” *Washington Post Foreign Service*, November 8, 2006.

³¹ British police identified the other seven suspects as Mohammed Naveed Bhatti, 24; Abdul Aziz Jalil, 31; Omar Abdul Rehman, 20; Junade Feroze, 28; Zia ul Haq, 25; Qaisar Shaffi, 25; and Nadeem Tarmohammed, 26

³² “Five get Life over UK Bomb Plot,” *BBC News*, April 30, 2007.

³³ The latter argument rings somewhat hollow because terrorism is an international crime, meaning that al-Berbouzi could be extradited under International Criminal Law applying the Universality Principle. Extradition treaties are not necessarily required under this principle because the crime is considered so heinous as to be one against international society. Hence, the principle *aut dedere aut judicare* (try or extradite) arguably may be applied in this case. If this is so, then the UK has a duty under this internationally recognized principle to either try al-Gerbouzi for the crime for which Morocco is seeking his extradition or extradite him to Morocco to face trial.

³⁴ Intelligence and Security Committee, “Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005,” Chairman: The Rt. Hon. Paul Murphy, MP, May 2006, 25–26.

Despite this revelation, it is interesting to note that as late as 2002 the judgments of this same committee had been that attacks against the UK would more likely be conducted by terrorists entering from abroad than by British nationals resident in the UK.³⁵

What began to unfold after the July 7 bombings was a complex set of circumstances that stunned many British observers. Not only were there large groups of people willing to strike at their own country, but there were even greater numbers who sympathized with militants.³⁶

³⁵ Ibid., 25–26.

³⁶ “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other – Europe’s Muslims More Moderate,” The Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 22, 2006.

France

Since the 1990s, there has been a marked shift in the origin of the radical Islamic groups engaging in terrorist acts in France. Prior to this era many Islamic extremist groups in France were linked to foreign radicals who had “internationalized and externalized their long-running disputes with their authoritarian governments into France with a wave of terrorist bombings.”³⁷ Over time, many of these foreign radicals were replaced by French-born militants who embrace terrorism and militant Islam in the name of a holy war that has “anti-imperialist” overtones.

Displacement of radical groups with international ties by homegrown militants from within the diaspora community has had serious repercussions for French society. Not only has it served to divide the diaspora communities from greater French society and culture, but it also has caused these communities to entrench themselves into resentful and segregated groups largely alienated from the surrounding environs. In reaction, the French government has, on the one hand, sought to safeguard these communities from persecution and hostility, and, on the other hand, been proactive in its attempts to keep them from spreading radical Islam to other groups in France. Over time, this trend has only served to create hostility, fear and suspicion of the “other” within the diaspora community as well as in French society.

Further, such satellite communities have become increasingly isolated and closed cultures in which the French government seldom intervenes. Hence, along with the establishment of such parallel institutions as commercial associations, clubs, cultural centers, private schools, and religious organizations a number of radical and violent militant cells have been spawned. With significant rates of unemployment, crime, feelings of isolation, disenfranchisement, and contempt running high among youths in the diaspora communities, recruitment has been relatively easy. The relative isolation of the parallel societies has led many Muslim youths to become contemptuous of France and to begin to identify with vocal fringe leaders who advocate terrorism. Using the cover of being community leaders, such Islamic radicals have promoted al Qaeda and its ideals.

This is all the more surprising, given France’s long history of assimilation of people from former colonies and, more recently, of those who immigrated and became French citizens by choice. However, French assimilation demands cultural uniformity and acceptance of a republican form of government that is strongly linked with secularism. This poses an inherent obstacle to Muslims who wish to interpret these demands as a form of discrimination.

France’s Muslim population is the largest in the EU and may be as high as 6 million

³⁷ Anouar Boukhars, “Islam, Jihadism and Depolitization in the French Banlieues,” *Terrorism Monitor*, IV, no. 18, September 21, 2006, 9.

people, or approximately 10 percent of the population.³⁸ While the majority of Muslim's in France, as elsewhere, are not radical, the tiny fraction who are tend to be numerically significant given the overall numbers of Muslims in France. This only has served to heighten tensions in French society regarding immigration and other issues such as the wearing of headscarves³⁹ that are seen by some as visible signs that radical Islam is gaining a strong, anti-republican foothold in France.

Largely unrecognized until recently, France has been dealing with Islamic radicalism for several decades.⁴⁰ The riots in the French suburbs in October 2005 and October 2006 brought international attention to France's Islamic community. In this and other events, the French have demonstrated their determination to stamp out any form of violence and terrorism on French soil. Since the 1990s, French counter-terrorism strategy has been evaluated by some as the most effective in Europe.⁴¹ Its anti-terrorist police have developed a sophisticated human intelligence network capability aided by broadly inclusive legislation, "conspiracy in relation to terrorism," by which authorities may detain suspects while evidence is being gathered to strengthen the case against them. Indeed, many members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) have quit France and gone to Belgium and Germany because of the pressure exerted by French law enforcement.

The preemptive approach has worked in conjunction with *Plan Vigipirate*, a national security alert system established in 1978 that bolsters police forces with military forces in Paris and other major cities. *Plan Vigipirate*, which was activated in 1995 after the bombing of the Paris metro perpetrated by the GIA, and again in 2000 and 2004, entails stepped up security checks at metro and train stations, enhanced border controls, and nationwide identity checks. Further, the intelligence community works closely with the judicial community to ensure that conspiracies in relation to terrorism are investigated thoroughly.

³⁸ "The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other – Europe's Muslims More Moderate," The Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 22, 2006, 41.

³⁹ French ideals of republicanism are strongly tied to secularism. A law barring religious symbols from being displayed in any manner in public schools was passed March 15, 2004, and came into effect September 2 that same year. While the law does not expressly point to any particular religious symbols, it was considered by many Muslims and non-Muslims alike to target headscarves. Since 1905, France has had a law forbidding public monies to be spent for any religious purpose or for recognizing or endorsing any religion or part thereof. However, arguably the real reason that the so-called ban on headscarves was enacted was because they were an obvious symbol of the growing alienation of Muslims from the rest of French society.

⁴⁰ Between December 1985 and September 1986, Hezbollah launched attacks in Paris as an extension of its fight against what little was left of the French and American presence in Lebanon. In the early 1990s, the Algerian terrorist group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), began raising money and recruiting volunteers to win back the Islamic government overthrown by the military. The Algerian junta encouraged France to help cut the GIA's support in France; as a result, the GIA retaliated against the French state. A series of bombings was perpetrated by the group between 1995 and 1996 that killed 8 and wounded 150. Prior to the World Cup in 1998, the French government launched a preemptive operation against the GIA, in cooperation with other European countries. Over 100 members of the group were arrested. On June 11, 1999, the GIA announced a *jihad* on French territory.

⁴¹ Ludo Block, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism," *Terrorism Monitor*, 3, no.17, September 8, 2005.

At the forefront of the judicial community's efforts has been an investigating magistrate, Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, a recognized international expert on terrorism who headed a group of three specialist anti-terror judges. Judge Bruguière has said that "[i]nvestigating someone for a small offence can lead to big results" and has interrogated approximately 400 suspects in the last seven years.⁴² He claims to have interdicted one radical Islamic terrorist attack every year, including attacks that targeted the 1998 World Cup, the Christmas Market in Strasbourg in 2000, American interests in Paris in 2001, and the Paris underground and airport in 2005 and 2006.

Judge Bruguière's trademark tactic is to conduct police sweeps that rake in dozens of people at a time for minor offenses and then to invoke conspiracy charges to hold them for lengthy periods, during which they are investigated. In 1994, for example 138 people were arrested and accused of aiding Algerian militants. Some defendants were detained up to 4 years until their trial in 1998, at which time 51 were found innocent and numerous others were given suspended sentences.

It was in this manner that French officials came to know of Ahmed Ressam three years prior to his arrest while trying to enter the United States from Canada with a trunk full of explosives. Judge Bruguière alerted Canadian authorities about Ressam, but the Canadian government failed to act against the Algerian-born asylum seeker. In fact, Judge Bruguière had collected so much information on Ressam that he was called by U.S. authorities to testify at the Algerian's trial.

For more than a decade, France has made it a practice to deport Imams who preach radical messages. In 2004, this practice became law. A bill was passed making it possible to deport non-citizens for inciting "discrimination, hatred or violence" against any group.⁴³ After the London bombings in the summer of 2005, the scrutiny of local mosques and groups became more intense drawing criticism from civil rights activists but relatively few complaints from the French public.⁴⁴ To punctuate this action, then French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy stated, "[t]he [French] Republic is not a weak regime, and it does not have to accept speech which, on the pretext that it is happening in a place of worship, calls for hate and murder."⁴⁵

France has made alliances with other countries in its fight to keep terrorists out of France. In September 2005, France joined forces with the Spanish authorities to form anti-terrorism judicial investigation teams. Composed of both police officers and judicial corps, team members have operative powers on each other's territory and are

⁴² D.B.S. Jeyaraj, "Jean-Louis Bruguière: The Tough Anti-Terror Judge of France," TransCurrents.com, April 6, 2007, available at < <http://transcurrents.com/tamiliana/archives/308>.>

⁴³ The bill originally targeted Algerian-born Imam Abdelkader Bouziane, who was expelled from the country in April 2004 after he publicly exhorted Muslims to attack U.S. targets in France and condoned wife-beating and polygamy. On appeal, Bouziane was allowed to return to France. With the enactment of the new law, he was again deported in October 2004.

⁴⁴ See, for example, Antoine Lerougetel, "France: Anti-Terrorism Legislation Tramples on Civil Liberties," World Socialist Web Site, December 5, 2005, available at <<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/dec2005/fran-d05.shtml>>.

⁴⁵ "France 'to Expel Radical Imams,'" *BBC News*, July 15, 2005.

collaborating primarily to combat *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (Basque Homeland and Freedom), better known as ETA, but also radical Islamic groups. Further, since 2002, France has cooperated with the United States in Alliance Base, a counterterrorist intelligence center based in Paris that also hosts officers from the UK, Canada, Australia, and Germany. Alliance Base makes the most of intelligence networks and is “unique in the world because it is multinational and actually plans operations instead of sharing information among countries.”⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Dana Priest, “Help From France Key in Covert Operations,” *Washington Post*, July 3, 2005.

The Netherlands

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, the Dutch came face to face with the issue of homegrown terrorists in the Netherlands. In January 2002, two young Dutch Muslims were killed in Kashmir after attempting to attack a heavily armed Indian patrol with only knives. At that time, the Dutch public little understood how two seemingly integrated Dutch youths could have become involved in militant activity in Kashmir. After the 2004 Madrid bombings, the Dutch government established the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Netherlands. This office began to scratch beneath the surface of seemingly placid Dutch society to reveal what were called “push and pull” factors that were leading to homegrown terrorism.⁴⁷ The November 2004 murder of Theo Van Gogh led to a quick response by Dutch authorities to implement a series of hard and soft policies against homegrown terrorism. However, the country still continues to grapple with policies and strategies that will work best for tackling this multifaceted problem in the context of their multicultural society.

Van Gogh’s murderer, Mohammed Bouyeri, illustrates perhaps a wider problem than the Dutch authorities originally understood. Bouyeri was born and raised in the Netherlands. The son of Moroccan immigrants who came to the Netherlands to work hard labor jobs, Bouyeri grew up in a blue-collar suburb of Amsterdam, Overtoomse Veld. A promising student, Bouyeri attended a top high school and went on to take university-level courses in accounting and computing.⁴⁸ His parents took him to a local mosque known for its moderate views of Islam.⁴⁹ During that period, he was known to be keenly committed to caring for those in his community, befriending troubled teens and planning youth programs for those in his neighborhood.⁵⁰ According to Stef Blok, a member of parliament chairing the commission reviewing Bouyeri’s immigration record, “Bouyeri was not a failure ... but an average, second-generation immigrant. He spoke Dutch and was Dutch. He was one of us.”⁵¹ Things, however, began to change.

Bouyeri left his university studies to enroll in a polytechnic to study social work. By now, in his early twenties, he lost his mother to cancer and had several brushes with the law, including a seven-month imprisonment for assault.⁵² There is little public information about Bouyeri’s prison time, but prisons can be recruitment grounds for terrorists. Upon his release from prison, Bouyeri took a volunteer position at a community center, where he organized football matches and tutored people on computers. He was fired from the

⁴⁷ Lidewijde Ongerling, “Home-Grown Terrorism and Radicalisation in the Netherlands: Experiences, Explanations and Approaches,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, June 27, 2007, 4.

⁴⁸ Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 84, no. 4, July/August 2005, 120, available at <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84409/robert-s-leiken/europe-s-angry-muslims.html>>.

⁴⁹ Andrew Higgins, “A Brutal Killing Opens Dutch Eyes to Threat of Terror: Crackdown on Radical Islam Follows Filmmaker’s Death, Immigrants Get Scrutiny,” *The Wall Street Journal*, November 22, 2004, A1.

⁵⁰ Ian Buruma, “Letter from Amsterdam,” *The New Yorker*, 80, no. 3, January 2005, 27.

⁵¹ Higgins, A1.

⁵² Leiken, 123.

community center however, after he tried to ban alcohol, demanded that women wear headscarves, and tried to stop mixed-gender meetings.⁵³ Bouyeri then joined the Salafist al-Tawheed mosque, run by an Egyptian-émigré. Though the mosque quickly denounced Bouyeri's attack, the al-Tawheed mosque was monitored by Dutch intelligence services, known in English by their Dutch acronym, AIVD, after a news network showed footage of a preacher praising those who had martyred themselves in suicide attacks.

Bouyeri had been monitored by Dutch authorities before he murdered Van Gogh. His articles in a local newsletter alerted the AIVD because of their Koranic references and dogmatic, fundamentalist views. AIVD also monitored Bouyeri's whereabouts and, for a time, his cellular phone traffic, because of his links to others in the Hofstad Group, an Islamist terrorist cell located in the Netherlands. Members of the Hofstad Group include Samir Azzouz, who was initially arrested in Ukraine en route to Chechnya where he planned to become a militant fighter. Azzouz was repeatedly arrested and released, eventually to be re-arrested in 2003 for the suspicion of planning terrorist attacks. Authorities had found plans of a nuclear power station, government buildings in the capital and Schiphol airport in his apartment. Another Hofstad Group member is a German-Syrian preacher, Redouan al Issar. Upon al Issar's arrest by Dutch authorities for planning a terrorist attack, he was deported to Germany, where he vanished. Both Azzouz and al Issar frequented Bouyeri's apartment for worship and meetings. Bouyeri was not seen as a high-priority target, and AIVD stopped monitoring Bouyeri when he no longer used his cellular phone.⁵⁴ Two weeks later he murdered Van Gogh.

Van Gogh was known to be a provocative, sharp-tongued filmmaker who regularly railed against Muslims, Jews, and any other minority group supposedly favored in the tolerant, equality-driven Dutch society. His short film, *Submission*, about the lives of four women and their negative experiences with Islam, showed naked women with Koranic verses imposed upon them. Van Gogh was biking to work when Bouyeri repeatedly shot and stabbed him, slashing his throat and pinning a five-page manifesto to his shirt. The manifesto had both the usual global, radical Islamic tirade—against the United States occupation of Iraq, against Israel, and against the oppression of Muslims worldwide—and a uniquely local flavor: Bouyeri railed against proposals for extra screening of Muslim applicants for public positions and threatened the assassination of Dutch politicians.

Bouyeri was tried for the murder of Van Gogh, attempted murder of policemen and civilians, and the illegal possession of firearms. In his testimony, Bouyeri told the court, "I take complete responsibility for my actions. I acted purely in the name of my religion." He also emphasized that he "would do exactly the same, exactly the same," and no defense case was put forward by Mr. Bouyeri or his legal team.⁵⁵ He was promptly

⁵³ Higgins, A1.

⁵⁴ Higgins, A1.

⁵⁵ "Van Gogh suspect confesses guilt," *BBC News*, 12 July 2005, available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4675421.stm>>.

sentenced to life in prison for the murder, which the judge deemed to have caused “great fear and insecurity” in the Netherlands.⁵⁶

Bouyeri and 13 other members of the Hofstad Group were then put on trial for terrorism, with Bouyeri tried as the cell leader.⁵⁷ The penalties included a 13-year prison term for Ismael Aknikh and a 15-year prison term for Jason Walters for attempted murder, when the two clashed with police during their arrest. Jason Walters, the son of an American soldier based in the Netherlands, was a Muslim convert, who went by the name of Abu Mujahied Amrik.⁵⁸ One other member received a 5-year sentence for possessing a loaded machine gun. The others were given 2-year prison sentences for lesser crimes. All were found guilty of spreading propaganda on the Internet and encouraging others to engage in jihad against the Netherlands and other Western states. This groundbreaking verdict established that promoting a violent version of Islam was itself an act of terrorism.

This was a groundbreaking outcome that many EU countries, grappling with their own homegrown terrorists, watched with great interest. Building upon a 2004 law that membership in a terrorist organization was a crime, the trial utilized new laws giving police greater latitude in investigation of terrorist suspects, including search of their homes and wiretapping. Prosecutors made the case that members of the Hofstad Group were terrorists because they viewed violence as the end goal in their interpretation of Islam.⁵⁹ The judgment rejected the prosecution argument, that those on trial were terrorists because they “incited violence, or spread hate or threats against non-Muslims...and that these are murder threats with a terrorist intent, namely the destruction of political and constitutional structures and inspiring great fear in the populace.”⁶⁰

The Dutch authorities do not view the Bouyeri case as an isolated incident. Indeed, a number of Dutch nationals have been caught trying to enter Iraq to martyr themselves.⁶¹ Authorities are analyzing how to approach the homegrown terrorism question, because the Netherlands is home to nearly 1 million Muslims, approximately 5.5 percent of the total population. By way of attempting to explain the radicalization of their countrymen, the Dutch have analyzed both pull and push factors. AIVD noted in October 2007 that an estimated 20,000–30,000 Muslims in the Netherlands are susceptible to Salafi radicalization.⁶² Moreover, news reports note that AIVD estimates that 20 fundamentalist Muslims are being groomed to carry out attacks in the Netherlands.⁶³

⁵⁶ “Van Gogh killer jailed for life,” *BBC News*, 26 July 2005, available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4716909.stm>>.

⁵⁷ Laura Smith-Spark, “Dutch face future after Van Gogh,” *BBC News*, 27 July 2005, available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4720867.stm>>.

⁵⁸ PBS, “America at a Crossroads: Europe’s 9/11,” April 2007, available at <http://www.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/about/show_europes_911_film.html>.

⁵⁹ “Nine convicted in Dutch Terrorism Case,” *CBS News*, 10 March 2006, available at <<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/03/10/ap/world/printableD8G8V65O1.shtml>>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Profile of the Hofstad Network, Terrorism Research Center, accessed April 1, 2007. Subscription service.

⁶² Xinhua General News Service, “Dutch terrorism-buster to launch probe into Salafism,” November 21, 2007.

⁶³ Associated Press Worldstream, “Dutch Government to Outlaw Attending Terrorism Training Camps,” October 19, 2007.

The pull factors are defined as “the appeal exerted by the radical message and the terrorist networks,” while the push factors include those “forces that can alienate people or cause them to reject mainstream society.”⁶⁴ In terms of pull factors, one important component is the Salafist movement, which has a growing following in the Netherlands. While most Salafists are peaceful and want to follow Islam as it existed at the time of the Prophet Mohammed, a radical minority wish to commit acts of violence to cleanse society of all things Western, including democracy and what are seen as immoral lifestyles. A further pull factor is the dissemination of violent ideology espoused by al Qaeda. Indeed, al Qaeda has morphed from a group into an ideology with global reach. The Internet has played a pivotal role in disseminating the radical message and, in so doing, aided in the spread of radical Islamic views, urging others to commit acts of violence. A final pull factor cited by Dutch authorities is the influence of trigger events. Because of the global reach of the media, even stories of relatively little note are being seen by young Muslims who may already be leaning towards their religion as an excuse to commit acts of violence. For one young Dutch Muslim surfing the Internet, the Israeli killing of Sheik Yassin of Hamas was enough for him to begin searching for bomb-making instructions for use in an attack. While the authorities caught him before he could perpetrate a bombing, his case is illustrative of how dangerous lone-wolf radicals can be.

The push factors in the Netherlands are not unlike the push factors found in other European countries. In the 1960s, large numbers of Muslims from Turkey and Morocco entered the Netherlands to work in low-paying jobs. Over time, these groups settled with their families in the Netherlands. However, there were striking differences between those people typically thought of as Dutch and the immigrant workers and their families. In addition to earning low wages, these groups were not well educated and were culturally distinct from the people in their adopted country. As a result, they did not integrate into larger Dutch society, which exacerbated the differences between the newcomers and the citizens of the Netherlands.

The problems of non-integration have continued to the present day, with a disproportionate number of radical Islamic youth emerging from, in particular, the Moroccan community. At the same time, there has been a steady increase in anti-Islamic feeling in the Netherlands as a result of the violence perpetrated by radical Islamic groups worldwide. Many in the non-Muslim population have isolated themselves, which, in turn, has caused many Dutch Muslims to turn inwards toward their own communities and place greater emphasis on their own cultures, religious practices, and languages. With society polarized, the radicalization of young Muslims has steadily increased.

The government’s response has been to form a three-pillar approach to the problem of homegrown terrorism. First are the preventative measures, which include preventing the radicalization process from occurring. Efforts have been made to integrate the Muslim community into greater Dutch society by preventing discrimination and Islamophobia and encouraging Muslims to become part of the Dutch political process. In so doing, the aim of the Dutch government is to foster social cohesion such that multiculturalism does

⁶⁴ Lidewijde Ongerling.

not mean groups that polarize, but rather, that groups respect and recognize each others' differences as a characteristic of being Dutch.

Further, some of the policies have been far-reaching and aggressive, targeting different subsets of the Dutch population. For all members of the Dutch public, starting in February 2006, the Dutch government launched a public information campaign about its counter-terrorism response to settle anxious citizenry. Through advertisements in the newspaper and on the radio and television, the campaign explains what action the government is taking and what the citizenry, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, can do to help. Launched in four major cities—Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague—by the Home Affairs Department, the campaign was refocused for other urban areas.⁶⁵

Targeting those who might be susceptible to radical Islamic influence, the government tried to block al-Manar and Sahar TV1 channels. Then-Justice Minister Piet Hein Donner contended that the channels celebrated terrorist acts and radical militancy. Other channels, like the Iranian-based al-Alam and the Saudi Ar Iqraa, also were put on a shortlist to be blocked. While trying to stymie “anti-Dutch” influences, the government also has pushed for a greater understanding of Dutch culture. New immigrants will have to complete 300 hours of language training and seminars on Dutch history and culture. In addition, courses for religious leaders on Dutch values and standards have been designed for religious leaders.⁶⁶

The second pillar of the Dutch approach to homegrown terrorism is the effort to identify and prevent acts of terrorism. Such responses include the amalgamation of existing police forces to create a new police unit, the *Dienst Speciale Interventies* (DSI), to address terrorism and organized crime. The DSI was created for rapid deployment and combines law enforcement and security services.⁶⁷ The Netherlands also has created war rooms, where various agencies come together to share intelligence and plans. By encouraging cooperation between law enforcement and security services, the Dutch will be better able to cross-reference and address threats. The AIVD also saw increased funding and growth in personnel. Recognizing that much of the recruitment and radicalization process occurs in correctional facilities, the Dutch authorities have segregated convicted radical Muslims from the rest of the prison population. Further, laws have been strengthened to include stiffer penalties for planning, aiding, and committing terrorist acts, recruitment has been banned, and the assets of terrorist groups are frozen.

A third pillar of the Dutch approach is to build legal means to prosecute those who participate in the preparation or execution of terrorist acts. In October 2007, the Dutch government introduced a bill that outlaws terrorism training, targeting those that do so with a maximum of 8 years imprisonment. The bill also targets extremists who travel overseas to train for terror attacks in the Netherlands. This latest step builds upon a

⁶⁵ Jennifer Hardwick, “Anti-terror campaign starts in February,” *Total Intelligence Report*, Terrorism Research Center, February 1, 2006. Subscription service.

⁶⁶ Maria Powell, “Van Gogh, European Purity, and the ‘Muslim Problem,’” *Total Intelligence Report*, Terrorism Research Center, November 24, 2004. Subscription service.

⁶⁷ Hardwick.

stream of measures, including making it easier to monitor suspects' communications, making membership in a terrorist group a crime, and authorizing the arrest of people who approach potential targets when authorities fear an attack is imminent.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Associated Press Worldstream, "Dutch Government to Outlaw Attending Terrorism Training Camps," October 19, 2007.

Germany

Despite the fact that Hamburg was the place where eight of the 19 terrorist plotters planned the 9/11 attacks, Germans considered their country relatively immune from terrorist attacks.⁶⁹ This sentiment persisted despite the fact that investigators believe that al Qaeda members have operated in Hamburg since 1999, and that one particular Hamburg mosque is a locus for anti-Western radicals to congregate. In Hamburg alone, about 200,000 Muslims live and work, making it relatively easy for radicals to blend in. In fact, Germany has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe after France with 3.2–3.4 million Muslims out of a total German population of 82.4 million.

Germans believe that they will not be targeted by radical Islamic groups because Germany did not participate in the invasion of Iraq. Also, approximately three-quarters (2.5–2.6 million) of Germany's Muslims are from Turkey (or are their descendants).⁷⁰ Turkish immigrants have shown little interest in political or radical Islam. While many Germans have voiced opposition ranging from fear to outrage that Muslims are taking over their country, they actually have had little to fear from the Turkish diaspora. Indeed, the greatest concern of the Turkish minority has been the German refusal to acknowledge that the Turkish "guestworkers" intend to remain in Germany permanently and that they wish to obtain German citizenship.

Hence, after 9/11, Germans did not have confrontations with Muslims; "the public authorities never thought 'all Muslims were terrorists.'"⁷¹ Still, it must be noted that over time the German public has become increasingly alarmed about Islamic fundamentalism. A 2006 Pew poll that found 82 percent of Germans were very concerned.⁷² It was in this setting that the first of a number of shocks to the German consciousness hit the country. This occurred in July 2006, when attempts to bomb two trains were made. Both were improvised explosive devices in suitcases, one placed at the Dortmund station and the other at the Koblenz station. Both devices failed to explode. Two men were arrested for this plot, both students from Lebanon. At first it was thought that the would-be bombers had self-radicalized as a result of the cartoons printed in a Danish paper that depicted the Prophet Mohammed wearing a turban fashioned like a bomb. In the ensuing investigation, which involved the analysis of computer hard drives and mobile phone calls, it was discovered that the attacks were commissioned by a man with links to al Qaeda.⁷³ The terrorist attacks were meant to be tests of courage that would qualify the two terrorists for attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq.

⁶⁹ The cell consisted of eight members: three suicide pilots, three logistical planners and two others who may have been additional suicide pilots but whose role remains largely unknown. "The Hamburg Connection," *BBC News*, August 8, 2005.

⁷⁰ "Islam and Identity in Germany," *International Crisis Group Europe Report*, no. 181, March 14, 2007, 1.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷² In fact, the Pew findings were that of all the countries in Europe, Germans were the most concerned about Islamic fundamentalism. "Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity," Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 6, 2006.

⁷³ Andreas Ulrich, "Failed Bomb Plot Seen as Al Qaida Initiation Test," *Spiegel Online*, April 9, 2007.

Despite this terrorist plot, Germany still appeared to be less a target for radical Islamic terrorists than some other European countries. It took a truly homegrown plot by two German converts to radical Islam and a Turkish resident to convince Germans that, “[t]error is in our very midst... Only naïve people can believe that these blinded terrorists will ignore Germany. The lesson of the day is that the risk of attacks by Islamic terrorists is also very high in Germany.”⁷⁴

In this event, the three would-be terrorists were allegedly tied to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which is an offshoot of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The three had planned to detonate three car bombs to hit a U.S. military base in Germany, a nightclub frequented by Americans, and possibly a major airport. The attack was planned for some time around September 15, 2007 and was intended both to kill Americans and to pressure the German government to close its air base near the Afghanistan border in Termez, Uzbekistan.⁷⁵ The trio, Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider, both German converts to Islam, and Adem Yilmaz, a Turkish man living in Germany, are believed to have attended terrorist training camps in Pakistan and subsequently to have formed the IJU cell in Germany which consisted of about 50 people.⁷⁶ A fourth person believed to be a German convert to Islam disappeared a few days before the plot and has eluded authorities. The plot was uncovered in the fall of 2006 with the help of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, which had intercepted e-mails between Pakistan and Germany. After receiving this notification, Germany mounted Operation Alberich, one of the “biggest surveillance operations in post-war Germany.”⁷⁷

The political fall-out of this plot has been great. Debate ensued shortly after the three were arrested as to whether there should be increased surveillance of converts to Islam, with one Christian Democratic Deputy floor leader, Wolfgang Bosbach, going so far as to call for all converts to register. There is a growing fear of an enemy within that will spread Islamism across Germany and transform “Germany and the rest of Europe into an anti-Christian, anti-Western ‘Eurabia’... that threatens to overtake the symbols of the nation and subjugate a destructively passive and self-doubting population.”⁷⁸ Vigorous debate in the German government has ensued, with policymakers divided along party lines. The most contentious issues are whether German security forces should be allowed to monitor personal computers and whether attending a terrorist training camp should be made illegal. Further, despite being declared unconstitutional in 2006, Defense Minister

⁷⁴ ARD-TVs Tagesthemen commentary, September 6, 2007.

⁷⁵ Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, “How the CIA Helped Germany Foil Terror Plot,” *Spiegel Online*, September 10, 2007, available at <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/01518,505265,00.html>>.

⁷⁶ Yassin Musharbash and Matthias Gebauer, “Islamic Jihad Union Threatens Attacks Outside Germany,” *Spiegel Online*, September 12, 2007; “Debate on Terror in Germany Highlights Political Divisions” *Deutsch Welle*, September 7, 2007.

⁷⁷ Musharbash and Gebauer.

⁷⁸ Anouar Boukhars, “The Threat of Islamist Terrorism in Germany,” *Terrorism Monitor*, vol. V, Issue 7, April 12, 2007, 10.

Franz Josef Jung stated that he would order fighter pilots to shoot down hijacked airplanes.⁷⁹

German authorities already have the capability of checking flight data and monitoring bank accounts, post office accounts, e-mail, and telephone data. In August 2006, the German government passed the “Counter-terrorism Auxiliary Act,” which expanded the powers of German law enforcement and intelligence to gain automatic access to the central vehicle registration office as well as to tap cell phones.

Overall, Germany’s record on combating terrorism has been mixed; its success in fighting homegrown terrorism is largely untested. While the conviction of Mounir el Motassadeq for his involvement in the 9/11 terrorist plot was a significant victory for German prosecutors, they had difficulty making the conviction stick. After the initial trial in 2003, Motassadeq appealed several times, and each time his conviction or sentence was set aside. Finally, in 2006 the German Federal Supreme Court ruled that he was indeed guilty of knowing about, and helping prepare for, the attacks. He was finally sentenced in January 2007 to the maximum life sentence in Germany of 15 years.

Similarly, legal wrangling occurred in the extradition request by Spain of Mamoun Darkazanli, a German citizen of Syrian origin who was suspected of being involved with al Qaeda as early as 1995. Judge Baltazar Garzón of Spain issued a European Arrest Warrant for Darkazanli for allegedly providing logistical and financial support to al Qaeda.⁸⁰ German authorities arrested him under the warrant, but he was subsequently freed by the German courts. Despite its having been ratified by the German Parliament in 2005, the German Constitutional Court declared the law creating the European Arrest Warrant unconstitutional and declared the Darkazanli warrant void. Spain retaliated by declaring that it would no longer recognize extradition requests made by Germany under the European Warrant. In 2007, after Germany had subsequently amended its legislation to recognize the European Arrest Warrant, Spain made a new extradition request for Darkazanli. The German Federal Justice Department denied the request, stating that German federal prosecutors had investigated the case and found insufficient evidence to warrant Darkazanli’s prosecution.⁸¹

⁷⁹ The Air Security Act, which allowed the Defense Minister to order the shooting down of a hijacked civilian airliner, was overturned by the German Constitutional Court in 2006. The court ruled that weighing a “life against life” was in breach of Germany’s Constitution. The only way a hijacked airplane can be shot down is if there are no passengers and only terrorists on board.

⁸⁰ Adopted by EU Countries in 2002, the European Arrest Warrant allows prosecutors of any member country to request the extradition of a person accused for some 30 areas of criminal activity. The request is to be complied with without delay or restrictions.

⁸¹ Spain argued that because Darkazanli had associated with al Qaeda leaders between 1993 and 1998 and had links to the 9/11 plotters, he should be prosecuted. Germany did not dispute these assertions; however, belonging to a terrorist organization such as al Qaeda was not illegal in Germany until 2002.

Canada

Though there have been spates of violence in Canadian history,⁸² incidents of terrorism within Canadian borders have been infrequent. However, it appears a new era has dawned in Canada, as in most Western cultures. Ahmed Ressay, the Millennium bomber, is an example of the new era. Ressay is an Algerian who entered Canada on false papers and then secured political asylum. He subsequently attended terrorist camps in Afghanistan. On his return, he attempted to apply his newly learned bomb-making skills to attacking the Los Angeles airport. An alert U.S. Customs agent caught him entering the United States with a trunk full of dangerously unstable explosives. Subsequent investigation showed that he was part of a group of petty criminals in Canada who were semi-organized and aligned with terrorist causes, including al Qaeda.

Ressay's capture in the United States initiated intensive scrutiny by Canadian authorities concerned that Ressay may have been merely one of many. Since then, Canada has taken actions not previously contemplated, including a terrorism designation for Hezbollah, the Tamil Tigers and the Kurdish Worker's Party, and making it a crime to provide financial support to those organizations. Canada is also pursuing monetary controls to stem suspicious transactions that may be fueling terrorist activities.

Ressay's case raised deep concerns in the United States and Canada over the apparent ability of a terrorist to create his own safe haven in Canada. This 32-year old refugee who was unable to pass the state-administered test in Algeria that would have enabled him to obtain post-high school education, was able to enter Canada with a false passport, claim refugee status, commit numerous crimes, draw welfare benefits, and easily evade deportation by creating a false identity as a Canadian and using that false identity to obtain a Canadian passport.

⁸² The most notorious terrorism-related incident in Canadian history is probably the "Air India" bombing. In Canada's worst mass murder, 329 people aboard Air India flight 182 were blown out of the sky by bombs apparently planted by Sikh militants. Another bomb was mistimed and exploded in Tokyo's Narita airport, killing two baggage handlers. Because this bombing was not directed at Canada, it is not considered in this paper. Earlier incidents concerning domestic violence can be found, but they are largely of negligible interest. The Squamish Five were self-described urban guerillas who in the 1980s bombed some industry they felt environmentally unsound. See, for example, The Squamish Five at <http://www.knowbc.com/iebc/feature_terror.asp>. The Sons of Freedom first appeared in 1902 as Russian immigrants who refused to send their children to public schools. They were mildly active into the 1960s, engaging in arson and bombings to protest schools and government in general. See, for example, Sons of Freedom at <http://www.knowbc.com/iebc/feature_terror.asp>. The most bothersome, however, was probably the *Front de Libération du Québec*. As might be inferred from the title, this was a Quebec separatist movement. They engaged in personal attacks, including murder and kidnapping, but by 1971 public support was on the wane. See Mitch Abidor, *Front de Libération du Québec*, Canadian History Archive, <<http://www.marxists.org/history/canada/quebec/flq/introduction.htm>>. Recently, a new group in Quebec has emerged called the Ligue de Défense, which has referred itself to as the "Nouveau FLQ." For more information see CBC News, "Police Chase New 'FLQ' Group," April 11, 2008, accessed at <<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/2008/04/11/group-threats.html>>.

Canada's policies at the time were sufficiently lax that a person claiming refugee status could anticipate 9 months to a year before a determination would be made on the validity of the claim.⁸³ Even then, very few people turned down for refugee status were actually deported.⁸⁴ Amazingly, although serious crime occurring before entry into Canada could be taken into account, crimes committed in Canada were not considered relevant to the adjudication process.

That was the state of affairs in Canada until the 9/11 attacks prompted closer internal scrutiny, at which time it became evident that there were impressive numbers of terrorist sympathizers and supporters in Canada. Over the past few years, Canada has worked closely with U.S. authorities, as well as those of other nations, in an effort to be aware of any attempts at impending violence.⁸⁵ In the wake of the Ressam arrest, Canadian security services began seriously to investigate a terrorist presence in Canada and quickly determined there were at least 50 recognized terrorist organizations in their communities. Some were more concerning than others, leading to the criminal bans noted previously.

Canada is a financial center that lends itself to large financial transactions. A Canadian federal report released in 2004 concluded that international terrorists and crime syndicates seem to be using Canada to launder money at a sharply rising rate. The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Center of Canada (FINTRAC), which tracks financing by suspected criminals reported that almost 200 cases involving \$700 million in suspect financial transactions were investigated over the 2005 fiscal year.⁸⁶ Further, there appear to be willing donors to terrorist causes residing in Canada. According to FINTRAC, some 34 suspected terrorist-financing networks were detected in Canada, down from 48 a year earlier.⁸⁷ In 2005, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) kept a watchful eye on some 274 terror suspects.⁸⁸ Even so, the money going to terrorism causes appears to be increasing.⁸⁹ FINTRAC tabled its annual report in Parliament in October of 2006, identifying over \$5 billion in suspicious transactions in the prior year. The report said 33 cases representing \$256 million were linked to suspected terrorist activity and other threats to the security of Canada.⁹⁰

⁸³ Bill Bauer, "Is Canada a Safe Haven for Terrorists," PBS Frontline, available at <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/canada.html>>.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ See PBS Frontline interview of David Harris, former chief of strategic planning, CSIS, available at <<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/trail/etc/canada.html#harris>>.

⁸⁶ "Terrorists Using Canada to Launder Funds," *Jihad Watch*, November 5, 2004, available at <<http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/003802.php>>.

⁸⁷ Stewart Bell, "Terrorism Financing on Rise: \$256M Came Through Canada in Year," *National Post*, October 5, 2006.

⁸⁸ Jeff Sallot, "CSIS Kept Tabs on 274 Terror Suspects Last Year," *Globe and Mail*, October 29, 2006, available at <<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061028.wxsecurity28/BNStory/National/home>>.

⁸⁹ See, for example, "Canada Shedding More Light on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, FINTRAC Reports," Highlights of the 2005-2006 annual report, October 4, 2006, available at <http://www.fintrac.gc.ca/publications/nr/2006-10-04_e.asp>.

⁹⁰ "Canada fiercely battling terrorist financing: Flaherty," *CBC News*, October 11, 2006, available at <<http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/10/11/flaherty-address.html>>.

Some Canadian residents have left Canada to join an African Taliban in Somalia.⁹¹ More concerning, however, are the arrests in June 2006 of 12 adults and 5 youths suspected of plotting a terrorist bombing. The group had taken steps to acquire three tons of ammonium nitrate—three times the amount that killed 168 people in the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.⁹² Authorities are continuing to look into a possible U.S. connection to the group.

Meanwhile, these suspects face a long road to trial while the Canadian court system strives to cope with a rising workload. Courts reportedly cannot cope with the large number of terrorist cases coming to trial. As of October 2006, there was a backlog of 34 cases involving 99 defendants.⁹³ At the same time, Canada's terrorism laws are being sharply scrutinized by both the courts⁹⁴ and the citizenry,⁹⁵ and the Canadian Government is poised to allow two broad anti-terrorism laws to expire.⁹⁶

An outsider looking in at Canada's terrorism problems sees a society wholly unprepared for terrorism. Canada's pride in a multi-cultural society has led to anomalies that work in favor of the terrorist. The concentration of Canada's relatively small population in discrete parts of a vast nation, coupled with a sluggish bureaucracy, makes it easy for a person to disappear. The historical willingness, and need, to welcome immigration has led to a laxness that fairly begs for the likes of Ahmed Ressam to come. Perhaps more importantly, the lack of a truly dramatic terrorist event in Canada leads the average citizen to wonder whether an aggressive approach that intrudes on civil liberties, as Canadians have come to understand them, is appropriate.

Nevertheless, it is beyond cavil that terrorism exists within the Canadian society. Where it is focused, who funds it, and whether tangible effects will be felt in Canada are questions that remain unanswered. In many ways, Ressam was an unimportant player in the Canadian terrorism scene. The fortuity of his capture merely led Canadian authorities to look within, at which time they found the disquieting certainty of more important players in Canada. The openness of Canadian society perhaps makes it more convenient

⁹¹ Stewart Bell, "Somali-Canadians join African 'Taliban,'" *National Post*, October 14, 2006, available at <<http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=8a4c3ee2-4ff7-4b4b-abb0-4f869abb6ca0&k=14788>>.

⁹² See "Toronto Terror Plot Foiled," *CNN*, June 3, 2006, available at <<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/americas/06/03/canada.terror/index.html>>.

⁹³ Sean O'Neill and Francis Gibb, "Terror Cases Run out of Courtrooms and Judges," *The Times*, October 26, 2006.

⁹⁴ Ian Austen, "Court Rejects Part of Canada's Antiterror Laws," *The New York Times*, October 24, 2006, available at <<http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0E13F63C5B0C768EDDA90994DE404482>>.

⁹⁵ Carly Weeks, "Canadians Concerned about Intrusiveness of Anti-terrorism Laws," *CanWest Weekly*, November 13, 2006, available at <<http://www.canada.com/ottawacitizen/news/story.html?id=178b6b71-c6b8-4dd2-a17f-66dc3c53beef&k=55408>>.

⁹⁶ Christopher Mason, "Canada Is Set to Allow Expiration of 2 Broad Antiterrorism Laws," *The New York Times*, February 15, 2007, available at <<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/world/americas/15canada.html?ex=1329195600&en=9a6bf18be8ea892c&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print>>. These allow police to detain a terrorist suspect for 72 hours without charges and a court to compel a witness to testify.

to organize and raise funds than to conduct terrorist acts in Canada. However, the June 2006 arrests indicate Canadians are not safe within their own borders.

Canada has been looking inward with great scrutiny since these arrests. When “asked about the arrests last summer of the 18 Muslim men and boys who were allegedly plotting terrorist attacks in southern Ontario, 73 percent of Muslim respondents said these attacks were not at all justified.”⁹⁷ This is encouraging, but only up to a point. What about the other 27 percent? At its worst, that could mean some 49,000 Canadian Muslims believe conducting a terrorist attack on their own country—Canada—is justified. Assuming the figures are accurate, the poll indicates between 49,000 and 84,000 Muslim Canadians likely would view attacks on Canadian oil sands development justifiable. It is fair to assume that some portion of those tens of thousands of people might be prone to carrying out such an attack.⁹⁸

This is the only incident of its kind in Canada to date. All of the 18 were Muslims, which, in a highly tolerant society like Canada, lends its own special problem. The police have vowed to be extremely intolerant of any anti-Muslim backlash, while columnist Christie Blatchford of the *Globe and Mail* takes authorities to task for appearing to be more concerned about a potential backlash against Muslims than about the terror plot itself.⁹⁹ Tarak Fatah, a Muslim leader and activist, acknowledges that these arrests are a wake-up call to his community. “While the overwhelming majority of Canada’s Muslims are stunned by this development,” he says, “few can honestly deny that they saw it coming.”¹⁰⁰

Why can few deny that they saw it coming? What persuades ethnic Somalis, living in the creature comforts of Canada, to go live in the privations of an African Taliban? Or the resurgence of extreme separatist groups in Quebec to liken themselves the *Front de Libération du Québec*. Unlike the United States, which has seen and studied domestic violence of many different stripes, Canadians are new to this endeavor. Prior to 9/11 there was no special emphasis due for terrorism within Canadian society. Post 9/11, there has been an acknowledgement of imbedded terrorist elements, but it is unclear why these elements have evolved in a society that is tolerant of just about anything and anyone.

Some believe the development of a terrorism culture and base of operation in Canada is sufficiently dramatic to require a new focus. Recently, the former director of the CSIS, Reid Morden, said Canada should appoint a politically independent intelligence “czar” who would co-ordinate the operations of security and intelligence agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and CSIS. “Times have changed, and there is a need for someone really to be in charge.”¹⁰¹ He said the intelligence czar would ideally be

⁹⁷ Licia Corbella, “Disturbing Reality Buried,” *Calgary Sun*, February 18, 2007, available at <http://calsun.canoe.ca/News/Columnists/Corbella_Licia/2007/02/18/pf-3642930.html>.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Daniel Lak, “Testing Times for Canadian Tolerance,” *BBC News*, Toronto, available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/6496900/2007/02/18/pf-3642930.html>>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Andrew Mayeda, “Canada Needs Counterterrorism Chief, says Former CSIS boss,” *Canada West News Service; Ottawa Citizen*, March 27, 2007.

someone with “practical experience” who could command the respect of Canada's tightly knit intelligence community.¹⁰²

Morden's call for change is an intriguing one. Canada is a large nation with a small, highly concentrated population. The natural diversity of Canadian topography alone no doubt makes it difficult for any organization to view the multitude of terrorism issues in a comprehensive way. Add to that topographical diversity a deliberate attempt to build a highly tolerant society that invites large-scale immigration and it is easy to believe that the social and cultural barriers exacerbate the problem of trying to develop a comprehensive thought process.¹⁰³ Unburdened by the massive population and the attendant bureaucracy of the United States, an intelligence czar well may be a viable tactic to draw the relevant agencies and capabilities together for rational anti-terrorism policies that can be divorced from the vote-getting process of politics. More importantly, a small organization that can focus solely on terrorism may be able to determine whether there is a catalyst for its sudden and unexplained rise in Canada.

¹⁰² At present, counterterrorism coordination is done by the Privy Council, but Reid, and others, believe that the Privy Council's job is to reflect the Prime Minister's views, which leads to a political outlook on events.

¹⁰³ Licia Corbella, “Disturbing Reality Buried,” cited above, is concerned about the careful stewardship of toleration: “But, hey, this is Canada, where in the interest of political correctness and fear of offending, the lead on these kinds of stories gets buried and our heads remain planted where there is no illumination and therefore, no truth.”

The United States

The United States may be the most complicated nation from which to examine the concept of domestic terrorism. For one thing, the population of the United States passed 300 million in 2006, which means that even fringe groups can attain significant size. Then too, organizations like the Ku Klux Klan have enjoyed resurgence in recent years, buoyed by terrorism concerns, burgeoning anti-immigration sentiments, and a tendency to substitute Islamaphobia for more complex social issues.

Literally hundreds of domestic extremists were arrested in 2006 and 2007 on charges ranging from hate crimes to weapons and explosives violations, to murder. However, that statistic is somewhat misleading because the greatest numbers of domestic extremist violence in the United States probably comes from extremist environmental and animal rights organizations, which are somewhat removed from the extreme violence related to terrorism. Additionally, there are other fringe elements that do not fit the classic model of terrorism. For example, historically, Cuban exile groups have accounted for a great deal of violence in the United States, but, like the animal rights and environmental activists, their violence has been more targeted than indiscriminate—in other words, it does not terrorize the general population.

For purposes of this paper violence from activists such as the Cuban expatriates, animal rights activists, or hate crimes (anti-abortionists and race-based acts) are best left to a different venue. This paper is concerned with radicalization of a nature by which an individual (or individuals) opts for indiscriminate harm to their own society. However, even that goal is a difficult one in which to pigeonhole some actors. For example, should one categorize a spate of church burnings as domestic terrorism, or as yet another example of simple arson? Or consider Lucas John Helder, who, in 2002, rigged pipe bombs in private mailboxes to explode when the boxes were opened injuring six people.¹⁰⁴ Was that domestic terrorism or the act of a disturbed individual? Does it make a difference that these injuries were widely dispersed, occurring in Nebraska, Colorado, Texas, Illinois, and Iowa?¹⁰⁵

Joel Henry Hinrichs III presented us with another intriguing question. On October 1, 2005, Hinrichs was killed in an explosion subsequently described as a suicide bombing. No one other than the bomber was killed, but Hinrichs was only about 500 feet from a stadium packed with more than 84,000 people. No political agenda was discerned, and the backpack with the explosives he was wearing did not contain shrapnel that would have enhanced harm to others. However, he roomed with two Pakistanis, had an apartment full of explosive-making materials, and may have been the person who attempted to enter the stadium wearing a backpack but ran away when a security guard

¹⁰⁴ See Jodi Wilgoren, "Student, 21, Is Arrested in Nevada in 5-State Bombing Spree," *The New York Times*, May 8, 2002, available at <<http://select.nytimes.com/search/restricted/article?res=FB0F1EFF39540C7B8CDDAC0894DA404482>>.

¹⁰⁵ Contrast this with the D.C. sniper attacks which were random, localized, wholly indiscriminate and deadly. During those attacks, virtually the entire metropolitan area was uneasy.

wanted to search the backpack. Numerous pundits have taken issue with the FBI's belief that it was suicide rather than terrorism.

Moreover, the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is not easily explained. For whatever reason, Timothy McVeigh became radically opposed to the Federal Government, and 186 people, including children, died because of his metamorphosis from disciplined soldier to domestic terrorist. What appears to separate Timothy McVeigh from Lucas John Helder is the radicalization of McVeigh as compared to the rambling unfocused thought processes of Helder. Obviously, selection of examples will have a subjective element to them.

In looking for domestic terrorism in the United States, it is useful to erect 9/11 as a line of demarcation between the domestic terrorism of an earlier era and the terrorism that we saw on that fateful day. Pre-9/11 terrorism was marked more by dissatisfaction with internal governance. Post 9/11 terrorism spawns from a globalized, pervasive threat to Western values—of which al Qaeda is an exemplar—that encourages violence anywhere and everywhere and is less focused on governance issues and more on hatred as a way of life.

In September 2006, FBI Director Robert Mueller stated that he saw a rising threat from homegrown terrorists. Reflecting on numbers, he said, “We have certainly hundreds . . . But if you're looking at terrorism across the board. . . we have several thousand cases.”¹⁰⁶ Director Mueller did not differentiate the types of terrorism investigations, and the FBI counts as domestic terrorism some events that were deliberately excluded from this paper. Those that are included in this paper can be divided into two general categories—those that would do harm in the United States and those that provide support for terrorism abroad. In many cases those categories overlap, but the distinction is useful to keep in mind, because the United States is a more substantial source of funding for terrorism causes than it is a source of terrorists.

Since 9/11, domestic terrorism has more meant support for terrorist causes than it has terrorist actions. In most cases, that has taken a tangible form, as in the attempt to supply goods or money to enable terrorism. In some cases, it has meant accepting training for terrorism. In still others, it has meant attempting to supply services for terrorism. Very often, criminal enterprise lies at the root of the means to provide support for terrorist causes.

In September 2003, Hassan Moussa Makki pleaded guilty to material support for terrorism stemming from a cigarette smuggling enterprise that was used, in part, to support Hezbollah.¹⁰⁷ A similar plea was reached with others of the same enterprise in 2006. Similarly, Sayed Mustajab Shah and two others engaged in drug trafficking and

¹⁰⁶ Michael J. Sniffen, “Domestic Terrorism Threat on the Rise, Says FBI Chief,” *Associated Press*, available at <<http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2006/09/08/72233.htm>>.

¹⁰⁷ “Man pleads guilty to providing support to Hezbollah,” *Associated Press*, September 18, 2003, available at <<http://www.tobacco.org/news/138144.html>>.

intended to use profits to buy Stinger missiles for the Taliban.¹⁰⁸ Another who sought to give aid to the Taliban was Earnest James Ujaama, who had been considered a pillar of his community.¹⁰⁹ In other cases, a Yemeni cleric was sentenced to 75 years in prison for providing material support and resources to al Qaeda and Hamas,¹¹⁰ Mark Robert Walker, a young man fascinated with radical Islam, attempted to provide goods and services to a designated terrorist organization,¹¹¹ and Carlos Gamarra-Murillo received 25 years for attempted arms exports to a terrorist organization in South America.¹¹² Numerous other arrests of a similar nature have been made.

Somewhat more problematic are those whose intentions are uncertain but either have had training or have violent tendencies. Uncertain intentions probably describe the “Lackawanna Six.” Six defendants from Lackawanna, New York pleaded guilty to charges of providing material support to al Qaeda based on their attendance at an al Qaeda terrorist training camp.¹¹³ Far less uncertain was a cell of thugs from Portland, Oregon, who pleaded guilty to various criminal charges, including money laundering, conspiracy to supply goods to the Taliban, and seditious conspiracy.¹¹⁴ Two who pleaded guilty to seditious conspiracy admit that, during the summer of 2001, they and others trained in fighting and with firearms in rural areas of Oregon and Washington State to prepare for jihad in Afghanistan to assist the Taliban in fighting against the armed forces of the United States. Both flew to Hong Kong to make their way into Afghanistan, but were forced to turn back when they were unable to cross into Pakistan.¹¹⁵

Perhaps splitting the difference between the Lackawanna Six and the Portland cell is a group loosely labeled “Virginia Jihad.” A number of individuals with varying degrees of culpability with respect to terrorism were individually sentenced for a variety of charges ranging from weapons charges to material support for terrorism. Two were convicted of conspiracy to levy war against the United States and were sentenced to life in prison. Because of the varying degrees of culpability, original sentencing was varied, but the sentences were harsh due to sentencing guideline rules. Subsequently, the Supreme Court

¹⁰⁸ United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California, “News Release,” September 25, 2006, available at <<http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cas/press/cas60925-Shah.pdf>>.

¹⁰⁹ See “Seattle Man Indicted on Terror Charges,” CNN.com/LawCenter, September 2, 2002, available at <<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/28/ujaama.indictment/index.html>>; U.S. Department of Justice, “Earnest James Ujaama Sentenced for Conspiring to Supply Goods and Services to the Taliban, February 13, 2004, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/February/04_crm_086.htm>.

¹¹⁰ “Cleric Sentenced in Terror Conspiracy,” CNN.com/LawCenter, August 2, 2005, available at <<http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/07/28/sheikh.sentence/index.html>>.

¹¹¹ U.S. Department of Justice, “Mark Robert Walker Sentenced to Two Years Imprisonment After Pleading Guilty to Aiding Terrorist Organization, April 28, 2005, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/txw/press_releases/2005/walker.sen.pdf>.

¹¹² See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “ICE Arrests Show Progress in Fighting Illegal Flow of Arms, Technology, WMD,” *Inside ICE*, vol. 1, Issue 1, April 12-26, 2004, available at <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/pi/news/insideice/articles/II4_28Final.pdf>.

¹¹³ Michael Powell, “No Choice but Guilty,” *The Washington Post*, July 29, 2003.

¹¹⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, “Three Defendants in ‘Portland Cell’ Case Sentenced for Conspiring to Provide Services to the Taliban,” February 4, 2004, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/February/04_crm_079.htm>.

¹¹⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, “War on Terrorism: Two ‘Portland Cell’ Defendants Plead Guilty to Two Charges,” September 22, 2003, available at <<http://www.fbi.gov/page2/sept03/cell092203.htm>>.

ruled that judges could exercise more discretion, and the trial judge reduced some of the sentences.¹¹⁶

Two individuals who appear to have had the intent to commit terrorist acts in the United States were Lyman Faris and Ahmed Omar Abu Ali. Faris was convicted of providing material support and resources to al Qaeda and conspiracy to provide al Qaeda with information about possible U.S. targets for attack.¹¹⁷ Ali was sentenced for providing material support to al Qaeda, conspiracy to assassinate the President of the United States, conspiracy to commit air piracy, and conspiracy to destroy aircraft. This was a complex case, because Ali, an American, had been held for 20 months by the Saudi government and had confessed to Saudi authorities.¹¹⁸

Then too, there are those who have other interests that support terrorism. Hamant Lakhani is a British national who attempted to sell shoulder-fired missiles to persons he thought to be terrorists in the United States so they could bring down U.S. airliners.¹¹⁹ Perhaps most puzzling is the conviction for material support of Attorney Lynne Stewart, who used her status as attorney to Sheik Rahman (the Blind Sheik) to permit him to give instructions to his followers abroad through her interpreter when she visited him in prison.¹²⁰

More recently, seven men, two from the United States and five from Haiti, were arrested in Miami and charged with plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago. Described by Deputy Director of the FBI, John Pistole, as more “aspirational than operational,” their leader nevertheless told an undercover agent that they wanted a full ground war against the United States in order to “kill all the devils we can.”¹²¹ It is not yet clear exactly what has caused this group of young men to consider the United States their enemy.

There are real questions here. Why would Americans, whether immigrant or native, offer to provide support to terrorism at all? Why would citizens and/or residents offer to take up arms against fellow Americans? Why would an officer of the court flout a court order

¹¹⁶ Jerry Markhon, “U.S. Judge Reduces ‘Va. Jihad’ Sentences,” *The Washington Post*, July 30, 2005.

¹¹⁷ T.V. Parasuram, “Kashmiri pleads guilty to terror plots in US,” *rediff.com*, June 20, 2003, available at <<http://www.rediff.com/us/2003/jun/19ny.htm>>.

¹¹⁸ Jerry Markhon and Dana Priest, “Terrorist Plot to Kill Bush Alleged,” *The Washington Post*, February 23, 2005, available at <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43940-2005Feb22.html>>; U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, “Ahmed Omar Abu Ali Sentenced to Prison on Terrorism Charges,” March 29, 2006, available at <<http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel06/wfo032906.htm>>.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Department of Justice, “Department of Justice Examples of Terrorism Convictions Since Sept. 11, 2001,” June 23, 2006, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06_crm_389.html>; “U.S. Department of Justice, ‘British Arms Dealer Sentenced to Maximum Sentence—47 years—for Attempting to Aid Terrorists,’” September 12, 2005, available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/lakh0912_r.htm>.

¹²⁰ “Civil rights attorney convicted in terror trial,” *CNN.com/LawCenter*, February 14, 2005, available at <<http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/02/10/terror.trial.lawyer/>>. Stewart would sit in the room with Sheik Rahman and the interpreter and pretend to be talking to him so that guards, who could see but not hear them, would think she was actually talking, whereas she talked to herself and Rahman and the interpreter carried on all the business.

¹²¹ “US Fears Home-Grown Terror Threat,” *BBC News*, March 5, 2007.

and permit her client to give terrorist-related instructions to his followers? There does not appear to be any “constant” that explains the diversity of these terrorist-related actions.

The United States has not seen the “pockets” of radicalism that one sees in the United Kingdom or France, but it does appear that violence is an attraction for some individuals. The Netherlands has noted this phenomenon among second- and third-generation Muslims, but in the United States the attraction to violence does not appear to be focused within any ethnic group. Rather, one suspects that attraction to violence and support for terrorist causes are bound up in deep, emotional dissatisfaction that has found an outlet in the phenomenon of globalized terrorism. Perhaps the best explanation for the wide-ranging, U.S.-based terrorist activity is to return to the beginning of the section and note that, in a country this large, it is possible even for fringe elements to attain a significant following. More importantly, in a technologically advanced society, pocketed within a shrinking world, it is entirely possible for a very few to cause harm to a great many.

Conclusion

The conclusion is inescapable that terrorism has morphed into something that questions national social, legal, and cultural policies. The fact that disgruntled citizens and residents may feel alienated and disenfranchised, and may turn to terrorism to express their dissatisfaction, means that these policies are not working as intended.

The United States has an interest in the way other countries contend with their homegrown terrorists. However, while it is feasible to work closely with European and Canadian counterparts in combating terrorism, it is more difficult to have any say in how these countries order their internal affairs. Multilateral agreements, while they are encouraging, are often too broad to be of use for the variety and scope of terrorist activities. Meanwhile, bilateral agreements are able to pinpoint specific problems, but these are often slow to be concluded and adopted.

States can ill afford to further alienate isolated and angry groups in their societies by declaring war on them. Profound and critical change will be necessary to alter the negative momentum building in some nations. Ever-widening rifts have developed in some societies as a result of policies meant to accommodate diversity and sub-cultures that desire to flex their muscle and assert themselves. These attempts at enfranchisement are provoking a near stalemate, in which parallel societies may spark a breaking point that generates discord and even acts of violence.

The growing phenomenon of homegrown terrorism requires further scrutiny, but it unfortunately appears to require scrutiny of individual states. It also requires that policymakers focus on solutions that get at the heart of the problem, rather than simply instituting more stringent laws and formulating strong anti-terrorism policies. No longer can this be considered a “war on terrorism;” the enemies are not only foreign actors, but also citizens and residents of the states in which they live.